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Sociobiology has made a resurgence in recent years, but has become enmeshed in political controversy.
Indeed, much of the work in sociobiology has been used tojustify repressive or racist measures. It is argued
that the unfortunate alliance of some sociobiologists and politicians is a poor basis for discrediting the field
itself; that a science of sociobiology is possible and, if we seek to know the nature of our social heritage (if
any!), needs be vigorously pursued.
Sociologists may considertheir specialty a child ofthis century, but it was nurtured
and trained by Darwin's work a century earlier. Spencer [1], for instance, made use of
Darwinian paradigms to develop and champion his sociological views, based upon
economic and political laissezfaire. Others, after Spencer, were more eclectic (and
less consistent) embracing Darwinian biology when this suited their preconceptions,
and otherwise ignoring it. One ofthe marvels ofbiology, as Margaret Mead has often
said, is that it can provide examples to support any point of view! However, the
development in the 20's, 30's, and 40's of a systematic approach to evolution, and
particularly of comparative psychology, erected inhibitions to the selective use of
Darwin's arguments and produced enough facts to somewhat discourage facile
generalizing. The most recent two decades, however, have seen a remarkable return
to the earlier 19th Century style oftheorizing, i.e., the effort to explain human social
phenomena through extrapolations from selected animals.
This modern effort in social biology has been heralded by ethologists, foremost
among them the Nobelist, Konrad Lorenz, who had originally made his mark
studying the displays of ducks. In two papers published in Germany in the early
forties, Lorenz [2] applied his theory ofreleasors-a pattern ofstimuli that inevitably
and automatically elicit an innate response-to human morals and esthetics. Lorenz's
argument proceeded as follows: In the evolution ofmorality, releasors for moral (and
esthetic) behavior appear. These are unique to each race. Hybridization ofraces leads
to a breakdown of the integrity of the releasors and a loss of appropriate response
patterns. Since human morality and esthetic ideals are tied to particular releasing
stimuli, hybridization between the human races will degrade morals and art. The
model for this notion are the specific displays that stimulate sexual intercourse in
ducks. When miscegenation does occasionally occur, the hybrid offspring shows
displays so different from either parent as to be largely barred from effective sexual
activity.
The fact that the promulgation of such a view did political mischief might have
been forgiven had Lorenz's notions been either inductively sound orfactually correct.
Parenthetically, let me add that some have argued that Lorenz's ideas should have
been suppressed even ifuntainted by flawed logic and factual error, but that is a point
to be returned to later. For now, enough to say that the reintroduction of what we
may call "social Darwinism" (with apologies to poor, innocent Charles Darwin) was
not associated with the world's most popular social movement.
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.Nonetheless, not too many years after the second World War, more Lorenzian-
type tracts appeared, some of them highly sophisticated, by technically competent
professionals-the anthropologist Coon [3], for instance, arguing a theory of multi-
ple and independent origins of the modern races of mankind-others, by writers of
rather limited background in biology-Robert Ardrey [4] and his anecdotes on
territoriality, for example. The flood continues, though now it is not rising unde-
tected. Levees are being constructed. I distinguish a levee-builder from an intellectual
opponent of social Darwinism in that the former, fearing the damage the flood can
do, would prevent it with dams and sandbags, while the latter seeks the source ofthe
waters so as to anticipate the flood and perhaps move to higher ground. Is the
presence of a supernumerary Y chromosome in man associated with behavioral
disorders? One could study this issue, seeking evidence that would test the null
hypothesis; one could also refuse to allow the study or dissemination ofthe results on
the grounds that prophecies of behavior are self-fulfilling and may thus be too
dangerous to be admitted. It is not an easy choice.
This issue represents but one aspect of the dilemma ofexperimental sociobiology.
When, to what extent, and how do studies of animal behavior-in particular, social
behavior-contribute to an understanding of the social norms of man? The recent
monumental study by E.O. Wilson [5], through the impetus it has given biosociology,
no less through the controversy it has spawned, makes this a particularly topical issue
(see Wade [6]).
One of the major difficulties in the interpretation ofthe behavior of other animals
lies in the uniqueness of the sensory world of each species. Ironically, the man who is
largely credited with the explicit recognition of this problem was one of Lorenz's
intellectual mentors, von Uexkull [7]. von Uexkull introduced the term "Umwelt" to
ethology, as a label for the environment as perceived by members of a particular
species. A profusion of white blossoms which present a uniform Umwelt to us, would
appear rather more heterogenous to bees, whose eyes distinguish between white
pigments that reflect or absorb U.V. The song of two wrens, indistinguishable to us,
may sound very different to a mockingbird whose capacity fortemporal resolution of
sound exceeds ours. And what is an empty, desolate room to us could be packed with
the scents and reassurances of nearby companions to a rmore olfactorily acute
mammal. In short, the stimuli to which responses are made are often not self-evident,
and may be identifiable only with difficulty.
While the differences between species in their Umwelt may seem to present largely
technical difficulties, they suggest a comparable lack of correspondence between
some of the functional or emotional correlates of superficially similar patterns of
behavior. Therein lies a second, major difficulty.
To understand the emergence of, let us say, the cusp pattern of human teeth, the
comparative anatomist relies upon the existence of parallels between function and
structure. Fossils often provide an additional clue suggesting how structures have
varied in time. Some ethologists, steeped in the tradition of comparative anatomy,
have applied anatomic methods to behavior. Territorial behavior in man is homolo-
gized with territoriality in other forms and its analagen may then seem to become
visible. Hear Lorenz [8] at his Nobel ceremony:
As a pupil of the comparative anatomist and embryologist Ferdinand
Hochstetter, I had the benefit ofa very thorough instruction in the methodo-
logical procedure of distinguishing similarities caused by common descent
from those due to parallel adaptation. In fact, the making ofthis distinction
forms a great part of the comparative evolutionist's daily work. Perhaps I
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should mention here that this procedure has led me to the discovery which I
personally consider to be my own most important contribution to science.
Knowing animal behavior as I did, and being instructed in the methods of
phylogenetic comparison as I was, I could not fail to discover that the very
same methods of comparison, the same concepts of analogy and homology,
are as applicable to characters of behavior as they are in those of morphol-
ogy (p. 231).
There are many objections to this approach; mine have been often enough re-
peated, but the polemic can be allowed one more repetition:
1. The distinction between analogies and homologies is essential to the compara-
tive approach, but the validity of this distinction is rarely, if ever, tested. The
excretory organs of earthworms and men may appear similar only in function when
viewed holistically; at the subcellular level their similarities may become structural as
well. In short, the level oforganization or "grain" ofthe investigator's perceptual field
may determine whether two structures or behavior patterns are to be regarded as
homologues or analogues [Klopfer, 9].
2. In a few instances it is possible to trace a direct causal relation between the
presence and action of a specific locus on the DNA and a palpable, measurable
structure. In a minute fraction of these cases a further link to a pattern of behavior
may be forged. This is rare. Since most behavior patterns can remain fixed even when
the muscles subserving them vary, the further link to DNA is likely more tenuous yet.
Behavioral development is a process involving multiple-feedbacks between DNA,
cellular, organismic, and external environment rather than the lineal unfolding of a
preprogrammed design for particular neuro-muscular networks. It is a system of
multiple controls, often admirably buffered so as to maintain a seeming constancy of
output, but with numerous intertwining pathways ofcausality and control. Thus, the
concept of the "evolution" or "heritability" of behavior is only metaphorically
comparable to the notion of the heritability of a particular cusp-pattern [Lewontin,
10]. Behavior, itself, does not evolve, but merely changes.
If there is indeed more than one way to skin a cat, what does this say about the
legitimacy ofefforts to generalize behavioral studies? Is generalization suspect? Recall
Lehrman's cautionary tale concerning Federal childcare centers and motherless
monkeys. Studies by Harlow revealed that surrogate-reared rhesus macaques dis-
played severe behavioral deficits. Ergo, child care centers which encourage surro-
gate-rearing are to be avoided. Later work by Kaufman and Rosenblum, with an-
other macaque, showed this species accepting surrogate mothering happily.
The two macaque species are more closely related inter se than is either to man
[Lehrman, 11].
Among the lemurs of the Duke Primate Facility are three species which have been
the particular objects of my studies. Fig. 1 displays Lemur catta; it lives in the forests
of Southern Madagascar, often alongside a second species, shown in Fig. 2, Lemur
fulvus. These animals are remarkably similar in their morphology and ecological
relations. L. catta mothers, however, readily hand-offtheir infants to other females in
their troop utilizing baby-sitters even when the infants are no more than seventy-two
hours old. L. fulvus mothers, in contrast, are much more zealous in their guardian-
ship; as a general rule, the infant is almost a month old before being regularly cared
for by a sitter. And now consider the third species, Lemur variegatus (Fig. 3), which
leaves its infants alone in a nest, visiting only at intervals. The infant is rarely carried
by the mother, and then only in the mouth [see Klopfer and Boskoff, 12].
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FIGS. 1-3.Lemur catta, L.fulvus, and L. variegatus at the Duke University Primate Facility. (By R. Haeckel)-L. f.
and L. v. (By K. Boskoff)-L. c.
Lest one believe that such major differences are merely reflecting a great taxonomic
distance between the species, consider another subject of my work, the Toggenburg
goat (Fig. 4). Several years' work and experience with over 100 individual animals
have revealed a very consistent pattern of maternal behavior. If the mother, immedi-
ately upon the birth of her infant, is allowed but a few minutes contact with it, a
subsequent separation of 1-3 hours produces no permanent difficulties in re-
acceptance. Denied this contact, even a separation of half an hour may lead to
permanent rejection [Klopfer, 13]. We know some other details about the underlying
mechanisms, but our most recent efforts to bare-all, failed totally. These efforts were
made at a commercial goat dairy, to which my colleagues, David Gubernick and
Kathryn Jones, travelled in order to exploit the availability of a large number of
animals. The control animals there did not conform to the usual pattern. This dairy
herd consisted of half-breeds, still one species, of course, so we must now acknowl-
edge that even intraspecific breed differences may be significant.
Where does this leave us? Is each species to be regarded as behaviorally unique,
providing no basis for prediction of the nature of the next? This could be so, but as a
matter offaith I prefer to assume there is a pattern which we have yet to perceive. The
pattern is apparently not one that corresponds to taxonomic order. I suggest it may
correspond to an economic order, and that it is to the province of cost-benefit
accounting that we might turn.
The suppositions are simple enough. Whatever tactics pay may become fixed [note
Hannon, 14]. "Pay-off," of course, must ultimately be interpreted in terms of genetic
fitness. For many birds, laying a clutch of five rather than of three eggs ultimately
fails to pay, because, on the average, the young from larger clutches are less better
nourished and have a lower survivorship, with a smaller proportionate contribution
to the next generation than young from smaller clutches [Lack, 15]. However, for
species whose young feed themselves and whose food supplies impose no immediate
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FIG. 4. A rejecting caprine mother at the Duke University Field Station for Animal Behavior Studies.
limits, larger clutches pay better [Hutchinson, 16]. In short, outcomes are not always
obvious, so while the supposition is simple, the determination of which tactic most
increases fitness may not be.
The second supposition is that animals can respond phenotypically to new de-
mands in advance of genotypic alterations. While there are obvious limits to this,
men may learn to swim, but whales are unlikely to walk, we do have to assume that
one particular mechanism-whether genotype, a limb, or a metabolic pathway-can
come to subserve functions very different from those which selection originally
favored.
The game is thus to determine what life-styles the demands and constraints of a
particular habitat will favor, and to develop equations which include terms for such
parameters as time-lags in responses to changed conditions, and morphological
limitations to adaptation. The differences in mother-infant relations exemplified by
my lemurs may then become explicable.
There are three general ways to play the game, several examples of which can be
found in recent publications. Assume our goal to be an explanation for differences in
degree of sociality. The first play entails listing broad principles, qualitatively stated
but still operational and heuristic. Alexander [17], for instance, has generated a list of
the advantages and disadvantages of living in a group rather than solitarily. Group
life affords greater protection from predators (except where protection is provided by
concealment), and may enhance accessibility of highly localized resources. At the
same time, competition for resources may increase, and the transmission of diseases
or parasites facilitated. In an effort to apply Alexander's various "rules," HooglandSOCIAL DARWINISM LIVES! (SHOULD IT?) 83
and Sherman [18] examined a colonial bank swallow and found the colonial habit
did indeed increase competition for nest sites and materials, as well as mates, that it
led to more instances of misdirected parental care and also more sharing ofectopara-
sites. Greater protection from predation was also provided, however, so this benefit,
outweighed the other costs.
A second play is to focus more narrowly on those features which appear most
pivotal with respect to the balance-of-payments. In the case of the swallows, this
would be the benefit provided by protection from predation. Triesman [19] provides
an illustration of this approach. He has examined the manner by which a predator
detects potential prey. He then developed an abstract but testable variant ofdetection
theory that predicts when the values ofthe governing parameters will prevent a prey
organism from escaping. Pay-off for the prey then depends on promoting those
specific conditions that preclude detection.
Finally, a third variant of the game, which will appeal to those more comfortable
with equations than field glasses, is to construct wholly abstract models which
identify the boundary conditions for certain forms of social grouping. J. Cohen's
treatment of primate societies [20] illustrates this approach.
In short, a science of sociobiology may indeed be possible-the development ofa
theoretic framework within the compass of which we can predict and understand the
varied manifestations of sociality. There remains the prospect that an encompassing
theory, one which includes man, will suggest certain political actions, or argue
against others. Equally plausible is the possibility that man will be shown so infinitely
flexible as not to be biologically restricted to any particular social forms. Either way,
we need to know the nature of our social heritage, if, indeed, we have one in any but
an historical sense, and that harm from such revelations is no more inevitable than
from any increase in knowledge. The partial knowledge that a species to species ex-
trapolation provides is deceptive: we do well to shun that. Here I join the workers
on the levee. But the bold efforts made by a few imaginative men [e.g., Wilson, 5;
Emlen, S., 21] to explore the upper reaches of the waters, these we ought applaud.
With such explorations we may yet find that the behavior of goats and lemurs can
also reveal man.
REFERENCES
1. Spencer H: Principles of Psychology, Second edition. New York, Appleton & Co., 1896
2. Lorenz K: Durch Domestikation verursachte storungen arteigenen Verhaltens. Z Angew Psych Charakterk 59: 2-81,
1940
3. Coon CS: The Origin of Races. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962
4. Ardrey R: The Social Contract. New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1970
5. Wilson EO: Sociobiology. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1975
6. Wade N: Sociobiology: troubled birth for new discipline. Sci 191; 1151-1155, 1976
7. von UexktJll J: Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1921
8. Lorenz K: Analogy as a source of knowledge. Sci 185: 229-234, 1974
9. Klopfer PH: Evolution, behavior, language, Communication, Behavior and Evolution. Edited by E Simmel and M
Hahn, New York, Academic Press, 1976, pp 7-21
10. Lewontin R: The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974
11. Lehrman D: Behavioral science, engineering, and poetry. Biopsychology of Development. Edited by E Tobach, LR
Aronson, E Shaw. New York, Academic Press, 1971, pp 459-471
12. Klopfer PH, Boskoff K: Maternal behavior in prosimians. The Study of Prosimian Behaviour. Edited by GA
Doyle and RD Martin, New York, Academic Press, in press
13. Klopfer PH: Mother love: what turns it on? Am Sci 59: 404-407, 1971
14. Hannon B: Marginal product pricing in the ecosystem. Journal of Theor Biol 56: 253-268, 1976
15. Lack D: The Natural Regulation of Animal Numbers. New York, Oxford University Press, 1954
16. Hutchinson GE: Copepodology for the ornithologist. Ecology 32: 571-577, 195184 KLOPFER
17. Alexander RD: The evolution of social behavior. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 5: 325-383, 1974
18. Hoogland JC, Sherman PW: Advantages and disadvantages of bank swallow coloniality. Ecol Monogr 46: 33-58,
1976
19. Triesman M: Predation and the evolution of gregariousness. Anim Behav 23: 779-825, 1975
20. Cohen JE: Casual Groups of Monkeys and Men: stochastic models ofelemental social systems. Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press, 1971
21. Emlen S: An alternative case for sociobiology. Sci 192: 736-738, 1976
Dr. Peter H. Klopfer
Duke University, Zoology Department
Durham, North Carolina 27706